Finding the bird’s wings: Dimensions of factional conflict on Twitter by Sältzer, Marius
Article
Finding the bird’s wings: Dimensions
of factional conflict on Twitter
Marius Sa¨ltzer
Universita¨t Mannheim, Germany
Abstract
Intra-party politics has long been neglected due to lacking data sources. While we have a good understanding of the
dynamics of ideological competition between parties, we know less about how individuals or groups inside parties
influence policy, leadership selection and coalition bargaining. These questions can only be answered if we can place
individual politicians and sub-party groups like factions on the same dimensions as in inter-party competition. This task has
been notoriously difficult, as most existing measures either work on the party level, or are in other ways determined by
the party agenda. Social media is a new data source that allows analyzing positions of individual politicians in party-
centered systems, as it is subject to limited party control. I apply canonical correspondence analysis to account for
hierarchical data structures and estimate multidimensional positions of the Twitter accounts of 498 Members of the
German Bundestag based on more than 800,000 tweets since 2017. To test the effect of intra-party actors on their
relative ideological placement, I coded the faction membership of 247 Twitter users in the Bundestag. I show that Twitter
text reproduces party positions and dimensions. Members of factions are more likely to represent their faction’s
positions, both on the cultural and the economic dimension.
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Introduction
Intra-party conflict is an often neglected, albeit important
dimension of party politics. It is highly important for
changes in party strategies and positioning (Bowler et al.,
1999; Budge et al., 2010; Wagner and Meyer, 2014), lead-
ership selection (Greene and Haber, 2016) and coalition
politics (Ba¨ck et al., 2016; Ceron, 2016a).
A common way of organizing this conflict inside parties
are factions of principle (Sartori, 2005), groups of party
members who share an ideological predisposition inside
the bounds of the party. These factions of interests or party
wings position themselves along the dimensions of inter-
party competition and attempt to influence leadership
selection, party strategy and policy. But do members of
these factions express differing ideological positions?
To measure ideological differences, I apply spatial mod-
els of politics (Laver, 2014) to individuals inside parties. In
parliamentary systems, this presents a daunting task, as
common measures of positions like roll-call votes (Poole
and Rosenthal, 1985) and election manifestos mainly
reveal party positions. As an alternative, social media data
is an established data source to estimate preferences of
users, parties and legislators on a common scale. Social
media gives individual party members the ability to com-
municate their political positions with no consequence for
government stability and little agenda control by the party
(Ceron, 2016b). Up until now, these measurements are
mainly validated for the U.S. context where individual-
level measurements are available (Barbera´, 2015). I suggest
a way to conceptualize political position taking on social
media in such terms as we can apply text-based position
measurement (Laver et al., 2003; Proksch and Slapin,
2010) that addresses the main issues of social media data.
I apply correspondence analysis (Greenacre, 2007; Lowe,
2016) to 800,000 tweets of 498 Members of the German
Bundestag. I show that the dimensionality of policy posi-
tions of individual Members of Parliament (MP) mirrors
the political dimensions found in expert survey data on the
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party level, both in terms of expected party position and
substantive content of the policy dimension.
Based on a qualitative evaluation of faction membership
for 247 MPs with Twitter accounts, I show that members of
ideological factions express their ideology relative to their
partisans both on the economic and cultural dimension.
Parties and their inner conflicts
Parties are often seen as unitary actors, as they propose a
common position that the leaders, or maybe even most of
the members, compromised on. These positions are ele-
mental for coalition bargaining, campaigning and govern-
ing, but are heavily influenced by intra-party processes.
The recent focus (Polk and Ko¨lln, 2017) on these intra-
party conflicts reflects the overwhelming anecdotal influ-
ence of conflicting groups inside parties influencing policy
and personnel decisions.
Budge et al. (2010) argue that replacement mechanisms
inside parties heavily determine the final positioning of
parties. Ceron and Greene (2019) show that these conflicts
change the salience of issues in manifestos, while Greene
and Haber (2016) show this effect for leadership selection.
Beyond internal decision making, this diversity influ-
ences government formation (Ceron, 2016a) and coalition
negotiation (Ba¨ck et al., 2016; Giannetti and Benoit, 2009).
They result from negotiations and conflicts between hetero-
geneous actors inside the same party, may they be individ-
ual candidates or organized subgroups, so-called factions.
Factions and tendencies
Factions are considered any kind of party subgroup, from
personal network to ideological club. While factions are
involved in leadership or policy struggles, they are not
necessarily ideological in nature. Typical factionalized par-
ties such as the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party are not
split along ideological lines, but personal networks of
patronage (Boucek, 2009).
Sartori (2005) called ideological groups “factions of
principle.” Differences, even “ideological” ones, do not
necessarily need tomirror themain dimensions of party com-
petition, but can also reflect differences on other issues or
dimensions of political conflict. These conflicts can be under-
stood in spatial terms (Laver, 2014), meaning that factions,
like parties, occupy a position on one or more policy dimen-
sions. To be influential in terms of party competition and
coalition bargaining, differences produced by factions need
tobevisible in theirmember’s positionon the relevant dimen-
sions of inter-party competition.
Intra-party groups which align themselves ideologically
along the main dimensions of party competition I call wing,
if officially organized, or tendency, if not. They represent
certain positions inside a political party (Bettcher, 2005)
that might conflict with one another.
Positions of faction members
So how will ideological conflict present itself in intra-party
politics? Individual politicians, just as parties, can be con-
sidered seeking office, policy and votes (Strøm and Mu¨ller,
1999). If a faction aligns along a relevant dimension of
political conflict, we would assume policy-seeking members
of this faction will share their ideology. Party members who
make the active choice to join an ideological faction there-
fore signal position in ideological intra-party conflict. How-
ever politicians can also be merely office or vote-seeking,
being dependent on faction-based patronage networks, and
therefore strategically take their position (Bernauer and
Bra¨uninger, 2009; Ceron, 2016b). Analogously, we would
assume that members of a party wing are close to their own
party, but also take a faction-influenced position inside their
party. To test this concept of intra-party spatial conflict, we
need to observe some degree of individual positioning inside
political parties.
Observing conflict on Twitter
Intra-party conflict is a part of political reality, but has only
recently found major scholarly attention, mainly since par-
ties go out of their way to hide it. As Greene and Haber
(2015) show, voters punish parties that seem divided, so
parties attempt to apply discipline (Andeweg and Thomas-
sen, 2011) to act and appear united.
This limits the expression of dissent and makes it difficult
to observe fromthe outside.Oneway todo so is the use of elite
surveys. Carroll and Kubo (2019) present an internationally
comparable measurement of intra-party heterogeneity while
Steiner and Mader (2019) show the effect of this heterogene-
ity on issue salience. Jankowski et al. (2019) demonstrate the
validityof thesemethods tomeasurechangesover time.How-
ever, elite surveys are limited in two major ways: First, they
do not represent actual conflict, but only preference differ-
ences between members. Whether or not this translates into
influencing the party line is not given. To measure conflict,
the stated positions should matter more than preference het-
erogeneity. Second, due to anonymity the data can’t be linked
to external data sources such as faction membership.
The traditional data source is the analysis of parliamen-
tary rollcall votes to analyze party unity or individual posi-
tions. This approach to measuring individual-level positions
was developed for the U.S. context (Poole and Rosenthal,
1985), where there is little incentive for party unity, but a
large incentive to adapt to the voters in one’s constituency.
This is not the case in parliamentary systems, in which the
government depends on the parliamentary majority (Bra¨u-
ninger et al., 2016). Roll-call votes against one’s party can
have dire consequences and therefore induce the necessity of
loyalty and possibly discipline, even if preferences deviate.
This leads to roll-call vote analysis underestimating intra-
party conflict in parliamentary systems.
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A less dire form to state deviating positions is political
communication (Laver et al. 2003), as talk is comparatively
cheap. Speaking against the party is much less consequen-
tial than voting. Accordingly, parties are less likely to apply
disciplinary measures. Accordingly, numerous contribu-
tions analyzed legislative speech (Ba¨ck and Debus, 2018;
Proksch and Slapin, 2010) to estimate positions in parlia-
mentary systems. However, in many parliaments parties
select who speaks for them in parliament (Proksch and
Slapin, 2012). As speaking time is scarce, it will more
likely be allocated to members who represent the party line.
But there are means of communication parties can’t
influence directly. Interviews and quotes allow individuals
to communicate deviant opinions but require a certain pro-
minence and are potentially biased by the media. A specif-
ically unrestricted and non-consequential form of
communication is social media activity. Social media is
comparatively free from agenda setting or selection power
by political parties. An arena, in which personal prefer-
ences and individual strategic considerations dominate
position taking.
Social media has been used successfully to estimate the
preferences of users on Twitter (Barbera´, 2015). As we are
mostly interested in stated positions of politicians, we apply
text analysis to positionestimationonTwitter.Boireau (2014)
and Ceron (2016b) apply Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch,
2008) models to the textual content to estimate positions on
the left-right dimension. Ceron (2016b) shows that Twitter
data produces valid estimates for individual politicians and
uses these positions to successfully predict party fission and
ministerial appointments. In this contribution, I extend the
Wordfish approach to multiple dimensions and present a the-
oretical framework for this measurement. While Boireau
(2014) briefly refers to Saliency Theory (Budge et al.,
2001), it is not clear how this relates to the data generation
process on Twitter. In the following section, I will present a
way to account for the specific features of Twitter data.
Saliency theory and social media
Text analysis started mostly with the systematic analysis of
party positions in the Comparative Manifesto Project
(Budge et al., 2001) and led to numerous methodological
innovations and countless substantive publications based
on their data. While manifestos only provide party level
data, the theoretical basis is also applicable to individual
communication. Subsequently, these manifestos were ana-
lyzed without the original codings using quantitative text
analysis (Laver et al., 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2010).
Based on the idea that specific words in political text are
indicative for positions, the differences between word use
is interpreted as distance. The assumption behind models
like Wordfish and Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) is
to some degree based on Saliency Theory applied to
manifestos before.
Budge et al. (2001) argue that politics as stated in man-
ifestos is not directly oppositional. They do not take nega-
tive positions, but ignore the positive positions of the
opponent and talk about their own issues. As Budge puts
it, they are not pro-unemployment, but anti-inflation, there-
fore emphasizing their side of the issue and neglecting the
opponent’s. Saliency Theory was developed for and during
the research on party manifestos which are “carefully con-
sidered and finely honed documents” (Budge et al., 2001) a
feature not necessarily applicable to tweets. Party manifes-
tos mirror the full scope of the political space as they are
drafted to be general and apply to all fields. They have a
catch-all, encyclopedic character. Twitter however is the
opposite of a controlled, thought-out political environment,
but a place for individual members and officials as well as
party accounts to communicate to the public constantly
without topic restrictions and limitations, closer to press
statements than manifestos. Grimmer (2010) describes the
content of press statements of politicians as their
“expressed agenda,” they signal attention toward a certain
topic to their constituents. Press statements are used in the
same way as Twitter: In contrast, they can be produced as
often as wanted, are not limited to a certain timing and can
be single issue. A single press statement does not contain a
policy position as in Saliency Theory, but the combination
does.
While Twitter data seems free, the reason for individual
politicians to address a certain issue could be non-
ideological. When we consider intra-party heterogeneity,
we have to assume some division of labor. This is a prob-
lem of all individual salience measurement as there is het-
erogeneity inside parties in terms of shared workload.
Parties have speakers for certain issue areas, send legisla-
tors into parliamentary committees and control government
ministries. For politicians that have these roles, we need to
account for this potential bias. I present a framework that
allows modeling the hierarchical structure and
multidimensionality.
Research design
These theoretical implications of measurement bias in par-
liamentary systems necessitate Twitter analysis of a party-
centered parliamentary system with known dimensionality
and according party wings. In this contribution, I will ana-
lyze heterogeneity in and between German parties. The
main conflict in German politics is expressed in two dimen-
sions. Traditionally, the economic left-right scale described
party politics well enough. Over time, through further dif-
ferentiation, the cultural dimension of liberal versus con-
servative attitudes became more important (Da¨ubler,
2017). Accordingly, factions that will be considered as
wings or tendencies have to be placed on at least one of
these dimensions. Following Bra¨uninger et al. (2012),
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factions are coded as being relatively conservative or eco-
nomically liberal in comparison to their party.
Heterogeneity in German parties
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has three major fac-
tions: the “Parlamentarische Linke” (Parliamentary Left,
PL) which officially organizes economically left-leaning
MPs in the parliamentary party group, the “Seeheimer
Kreis” (Seeheim Circle, SEEH), a more conservative and
business oriented group as well as the “Netzwerk Berlin”
(Network Berlin, “NB”) (Bernauer and Bra¨uninger, 2009).
The Seeheimer Kreis takes more conservative positions in
economic issues but also on law and order issues (Decker
and Neu, 2018). The Netzwerk Berlin is ideologically less
clear, but seems economically closer to the Seeheimer
Kreis, while not sharing their social policy positions
(Niedermayer, 2013).
The Left Party (DIE LINKE) is the fusion of the PDS
(German Socialist Party), which stems from the East German
Communist state party, and a split-off of left-wing SPD pol-
iticians during the SPD-led government that imposed labor
market reform. They are ideologically split in numerous fac-
tions: the pragmatic “Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus”
(Forum for Democratic Socialism, FDS), the left-wing fac-
tions “Kommunistische Plattform” (Communist Platform,
KP) as well as the “Antikapitalistische Linke” (Anticapitalist
Left, AKL) and the “Sozialistische Linke”(Socialist Left,
SL). Orthogonal to this conflict, the “Emanzipatorische
Linke” (“Emancipation Left”) stands for a more post-
materialist approach, focusing on environmentalism and
gender.
In the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU), faction-
alism is less important (Decker and Neu, 2018). Tradition-
ally, the “Mittelstandsvereinigung” (Middle Class Union,
MIT) proposed economically right-wing positions, against
the leftist “Arbeitnehmerflu¨gel” (Wing of Employees,
CAD). More recently, three culturally oriented factions, the
liberal “Union der Mitte” (Union of the Center, UM) and
the socially conservative “Werteunion” (Values Union,
WU), as well as their less extreme parliamentary counter-
part, the “Berliner Kreis” (Berlin Circle, BK).
The “natural ally” of the CDU are the Liberals (FDP),
which had two factions, the social liberal and the market
liberal wing. While starting out as the kingmaker between
the major parties, the FDP gradually moved to the conser-
vative side of the political spectrum and with it elevating
the market liberal forces inside, ending ideological fac-
tional conflict.
Traditionally, the Green Party is split into two major
factions, the Fundis (Fundamentalists, FUNDI) and the
Realos (Pragmatists, REAL). While the former was leftist
and against governing, emphasizing the role as a social
movement over party, the latter was actively lobbying for
coalitions with the SPD (Decker and Neu, 2018;
Niedermayer, 2013). Today, Fundi members of parliament
are considered the left-wing, while Realos are considered
the moderate faction, both economically and socially.
TheAlternative fu¨r Deutschland (AfD) has entered the
Bundestag as a populist challenger in 2017. While starting
as a mainly economically conservative party (Jankowski
et al., 2017), it evolved quickly into a socially conservative
anti-immigration party with right-wing tendencies. This
internal conflict has led to strong factionalism inside the
AfD: “moderate” ordoliberal economists of the “Alternative
Mitte” (Alternative Center, mod) versus the nationalistic
“Flu¨gel” (The Wing, rw) and the national-conservatives
(nk), mainly in eastern German states (Decker and Neu,
2018).
The membership in a faction is a more or less official act.
Some factions are highly institutionalized and provide full
member lists. Other “factions” can only be inferred by press
articles or qualitative assessments. Bernauer and Bra¨uninger
(2009) used a survey ofMPs to assess themselves and others.
In this study, faction membership was coded by the analysis
of a wide number of sources (found in the Online Appendix).
Based on 75 individual sources, faction associations for 246
MPs with Twitter accounts could be identified. Membership
was coded if a news article, an official list or the MP them-
self in an interview reveals faction membership explicitly.
For the AfD, official faction referrals are very rare. In press
articles, members were labeled “moderate,” “national con-
servative,” “ultra-right” based on previous affiliations and
actions of the MPs. While this is far from optimal, it again
makes the case for the necessity to develop quantifiable
measures for intra-party heterogeneity. Table 1 summarizes
the expectations of MP behavior based on their orientation.
I use the Twitter API implementation in the R package
rtweet (Kearney, 2018) to collect data from the timelines of
500 German MPs for the year 2017. As retweets are con-
sidered affirmative, at least inside a party, a retweet is
indicative of emphasis. However, I removed all Twitter
handles, since they create artificial proximity of words of
accounts. Analysis including hashtags and mentions creates
slightly stronger clusters of parties, which can’t be consid-
ered common position, but a feature of social networks
created by Twitter itself.
I relied on the Quanteda (Benoit et al., 2018) package to
clean the data. To prepare the data, I removed all URLs,
lower cased and cleaned for HTML code (like in emojis
etc.). I removed stopwords, names of politicians, punctua-
tion and numbers. Since tweets are quite informal and scal-
ing mechanisms are very susceptible to clusters of unique
terms, I removed very rare words (Slapin and Proksch,
2008), more particularly those words that were used by less
than 100 accounts. This step is optional but otherwise
requires removal of outliers later on. It also makes the
wordplots used to evaluate the substantive content of the
dimensions more difficult to interpret. Results from other
specifications can be found in the Online Appendix.
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As argued above, the assumptions of a purely ideological
selection of issues and therefore expressed agenda do not
necessarily hold for individuals inside political parties. To
account for these effects, it is necessary to control formechan-
isms that might lead to this behavior. To do so, I collected the
committee memberships, government positions in ministries
and mandate type of all members of the German Bundestag
from the homepage www.abgeordnetenwatch.de, which is
based on the less accessible database of the Bundestag.
4.2 Method: Canonical correspondence analysis
Measuring latent positions empirically means projecting
them in lower dimensional political space. Two approaches
dominate the literature: the theory-driven classification of
particular issues as defining a dimension. The second
approach is recovering the dimensions from the data itself,
using methods of dimensional reduction (Benoit and Laver,
2012; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). These approaches are
inductive and require a posteriori interpretation. To allow
interpretation, it is useful to consider additional results
these models provide, the factor loading or feature scores
used by the model to define the dimension and scale the
position. For the analysis of social media, the creation of a
priori dimensions is impossible due to the large amount of
unstructured data.
While the substantive meaning of the many data sources
available for position estimation differ, the methods
applied to them have been quite similar (Lowe, 2016). To
make qualified assumptions about the substantive meaning
of the dimensions, we have to interpret the features which
constitute the dimension. Based on this, we can interpret
the proximity of the feature and the case as being similar
and content-wise related. Lowe (2016) suggests correspon-
dence analysis (CA) and biplots to maximize interpretabil-
ity (Greenacre, 2007).
A major problem addressed in the previous section are
non-ideological causesof salience.Due to intra-party division
of labor, individual politiciansmight have issues they empha-
size, not because theyaremoreconservative, but because they
represent their party on these issues. For example, members
of the labor and welfare committee might discuss issues that
are considered “leftist,” not because they are leftist them-
selves, but because they are members of the committee.
Ter Braak (1987) presents canonical correspondence
analysis which incorporates multivariate analysis of
“environmental” factors in the scaling of positions. There-
fore, we can reduce the impact terms used by all members
of a committee on the derived ideological position.
Dimensions and determinants
of heterogeneity
Based on Twitter data since January 2017, I estimate the
ideological position of 498 members of the German Bun-
destag who have active Twitter accounts. First, I will show
the dimensionality of the Twittersphere and what issues
and terms distinguish politicians from one another. Then,
I will test the effect of faction membership on these respec-
tive dimensions.
Table 1. Factions and their ideologies in the German Bundestag.
party name social economic type faction count
AfD Flu¨gel 2 0 Tendency RW 10
AfD Alternative Mitte 1 0 Tendency MOD 17
AfD Nationalkonservativ 1 1 Tendency NK 24
CDU Werte Union 2 0 Wing WU 0
CDU Berliner Kreis 1 0 Wing BK 7
CDU Union der Mitte 1 1 Wing UM 5
CDU Mittelstandsvereinigung 0 1 Wing MIT 23
CDU Arbeitnehmer 0 1 Wing CDA 1
FDP Liberaler Mittelstand 0 1 Wing LM 1
FDP Liberaler Aufbruch 1 1 Wing LA 0
FDP Dahrendorfer Kreis 1 1 Wing DK 0
GRUENE Fundis 1 1 Wing FUNDI 17
GRUENE Realos 1 1 Wing REAL 21
LINKE Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus 1 2 Wing FDS 4
LINKE Antikapitalistische Linke 1 1 Wing AKL 9
LINKE Sozialistische Linke 1 1 Wing SL 11
LINKE Netzwerk Reformlinke 0 0 Personalized Wing RL 2
LINKE Kommunistische Plattform 0 2 Wing KP 1
LINKE Emanzipatorische Linke 2 0 Wing EL 3
SPD Seeheimer Kreis 1 1 Wing SEEH 18
SPD Netzwerk Berlin 0 1 Wing NB 15
SPD Parlamentarische Linke 1 -1 Wing PL 18
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Dimensions of Twitter space
Correspondence analysis extracts dimensions based on their
ability to explain variation in the data. I chose the first three
dimensions based on inspecting the screeplot (see Online
Appendix figure 5,2). The main dimension of difference
extracted from the model can be interpreted as the emphasis
on migration (see Online Appendix). In other words, the big-
gest difference between politicians in Germany is whether or
not they talk about refugees. The second dimension is the
classical left-right dimension, while the third represents
liberal emphasis not related to migration. Dimensions one
and three can only be interpreted in combination with the
underlying left-right dimension. They have to be separated.
To compute the economic left-right dimension I remove
all terms which also correlate to migration and cultural
salience and subtract the corresponding coordinates. To
compute the cultural dimension, I add these migration and
cultural terms to the left-right dimension and add the cor-
responding coordinates. The results are shown in Figure 1,
the upper of which shows the positions of all 500 MPs in
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Figure 1. First and second dimension. Terms automatically translated and placed approximately. Dots indicate expected position based on CHES
2017.
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political space (I removed one outlier on the third
dimension).
We see the parties cluster as we would expect them
based on the underlying dimensions. The expected posi-
tions from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al.,
2017), scaled on the Twitter dimensions, overlap with the
party clusters derived here. Only the AfD seems less eco-
nomically conservative and the SPD very heterogeneous on
the cultural dimension.
The terms are scaled accordingly and can be observed in
the lower part of Figure 1. To validate my findings, I first
substantiate the dimensions based on the content of the
dimensions and the general party positions. Then, I test
whether individual differences in faction membership
influence the relative position inside their parties. In the
upper left quadrant, we have terms related to civil liberties
from civil rights to data protection. This area is occupied by
the Liberals. Straight on top, we find terms like market
democracy and middle class, subsidies and innovation.
Moving to the left end of the spectrum, we see environ-
mental issues, covered by the Green Party. In the overlap-
ping areas, we find terms like CO2 taxation, highways,
regulation. Moving down the economic left-right scale,
we find cultural left-wing issues such as women rights,
abortion, equality and equal pay. Further down in the area
of the Left Party, we see straight up terms such as capital-
ism, solidarity, rents, pensions. Moving along on the cul-
tural axis, we now find issues like refugees and anti-war
efforts. In the center of the distribution, we find the quite
scattered SPD, some of which are part of the FDP cluster,
while some move quite for the cultural right, overlapping
with the CDU. The CDU occupies issue areas that are quite
“apolitical.” Their tweets mainly communicate party
events and district visits. However, some are scattered into
FDP territory while some are closer to the AfD. The AfD is
the most separate cluster. In contrary to expert surveys, the
AfD is not economically right-wing. It is about as conser-
vative as the SPD and less conservative than the CDU.
Instead, the AfD polarizes heavily on the cultural dimen-
sions. They occupy terms such as migrant, illegal, terror-
ism, deportation and border control. While this seems to be
surprising, the cause is that the AfD talks about little else,
and specifically not about social or economic issues. This is
why the model can’t really judge the AfD’s economic posi-
tion and scales them at 0.
Factional determinants of positions
After substantiating the meaning of the dimensions and
successfully placing the party clusters, the question
remains whether the extracted positions are valid on the
individual level. Are individual differences inside parties
indicative for intra-party heterogeneity?
Based on the concept of a two-dimensional policy space
and the relative factional orientations, I test their effect on
the respective dimensions. All in all, 247 individuals iden-
tified with both a Twitter account and a faction member-
ship or known ideological orientation. Each of them was
assigned their factions political orientations, based on
Table 1. All other individuals were coded zero, as if having
no orientation, leading to a very conservative estimate. I
test the effect of faction membership on the economic left-
right dimension.
Figure 2 shows the results of three OLS-regressions. In
the first model, I test the main effect. In the second model, I
include the cultural faction orientation as a control variable.
In the third model, I control for mandate type since party,
faction and mandate type are not independently distributed.
I also control for being a frontbencher, as we would assume
that this correlates with faction membership and ideology
and might bias estimates.
In general we can see that the effect of parties dominates
almost completely: Left-wing parties are of course more
left-wing on Twitter, an observation we already encoun-
tered in the dimensional analysis. However, members of
economic right-wing factions are slightly more economi-
cally right-wing than their counterparts. While this effect is
small, it is statistically significant. Of course, the low num-
ber of actual cases in which faction membership is known
is low and inflated by many zeros. It replicates the results of
Bernauer and Bra¨uninger (2009) who find 3 percent of
variation explained by faction membership.
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Figure 2. Effect of faction membership on the economic dimen-
sion. Error bars indicate 95 and 90 percent confidence intervals. N ¼
489. Regression tables in the appendix. Reference Party: AfD.
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On the cultural dimension, which is tested analogously
in Figure 3, we also find the expected effect, albeit small,
after controlling for the faction’s economic orientation.
Conclusion
In general we can constitute that the expected effects are
visible in social media. Members of conservative parties
and factions are more likely to tweet conservatively, there-
fore validating measurement. However, the strong party
effects we observe indicate that factions play a minor, yet
significant role in MP’s expressed positions.
This contribution presents and validates a new method
to extract political positions for individuals. Through the
application of quantitative text analysis of tweets, we can
estimate individual positions of political actors, even in
party-centered systems. Ceron (2016b) showed the first
application of a comparable method, I provide multidimen-
sional ideal points for all Twitter using members of a par-
liament and show that the underlying dimensions have
substantive meaning for intra- and inter-party competition.
Like Ceron, I can validate my findings, showing that Twit-
ter is a valid and useful data source that is easily collected
and, along with the right tool set, easily analyzed.
This method can contribute to various fields in political
science from research on party discipline, coalition
research or party competition, in which individual
preferences or positions in contrast to parties are relevant.
One particular advantage is that it not only allows to scale
members of the same legislature, but extends to any poli-
tician or institution with a Twitter account. Future research
will extend this approach to nominally non-ideological fac-
tions such as regional and demographic party organizations
like youth wings or state-level parties as well as state-level
legislators. In principle we can project ministers, politicians
or interest groups in the same political space. This would
allow to tackle questions of multi-level party competition
and connect geographic intra-party heterogeneity and
regional party systems. It would also allow the comparison
of individual positions in different stages of political
careers.
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